Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 23 | Number 1

Article 2

1-1-2000

NBA v. Motorola: A Legislative Proposal Favoring
the Nature of Property, the Survival of Sports
Leagues, and the Public Interest
Neal H. Kaplan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Neal H. Kaplan, NBA v. Motorola: A Legislative Proposal Favoring the Nature of Property, the Survival of Sports Leagues, and the Public
Interest, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 29 (2000).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol23/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

NBA v. Motorola:
A Legislative Proposal Favoring the
Nature of Property, the Survival of Sports
Leagues, and the Public Interest
by
NEAL H. KAPLAN*

I. Overview of National Basketball Association v. Motorola ....... 32
A. The Second Circuit Decision: A Critique ....................... 33
1. Are Sporting Events Copyrightable? ............ ......... . . . 33
2. Does the "Hot News" Exception Apply? ........ ...... . . . 34
B. Defining the Relevant Market: A Broader View of
D irect Com petition ...........................................................
36
C. The Public Interest in Protecting the Sports Leagues ..... 38
D. Treating Sports as a Special Industry .............................. 40
1. B aseball .......................................................................
40
2. F ootball ..........................................................................
41
II. NBA v. Motorola: In the Public Interest? ................ ........... . . . 43
A . C opyright ............................................................................
44
1. The Doctrinal Debate: Property Rights
Versus Regulation of Distribution ............................. 44
2. Property Rights: Preferred for the
Promotion of Learning ...............................................
45
a. No Such Thing as a Free Ride .............................. 46
b. Protecting the Economic Incentives .................... 47
B. Free Speech: The First Amendment and Fair Use ........ 50

* The Author graduated from Harvard Law School cum laude in 1998, and is
currently an attorney with Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro LLP in Los Angeles,
specializing in entertainment and intellectual property litigation. The Author would like to
thank Professor Paul C. Weiler for his valued support and guidance in the writing of this
Article, earlier versions of which were awarded first prize in the 12" Annual
Entertainment Law Writing Competition sponsored by the Intellectual Property and
Entertainment Law Section of the L.A. County Bar Association, and second prize in
ASCAP's Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition for best paper in copyright law at
Harvard Law School in 1998.

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

[23:29

1. The First Amendment's Treatment of Private Speech ....50
2. The First Amendment's Treatment of
Commercial Speech ...................................................
51
3. Fair Use Doctrine: Free Speech Concerns
Within Copyright Law .................................................
53
a. Applying Fair Use Doctrine to Motorola ........... 53
b. Analyzing Motorola in Light of First
Amendment Policies ............................................
54
C . A ntitrust ............................................................................
55
1. Sports Leagues on the Playing Field: Legitimate
Joint V entures .............................................................
56
2. Sports Leagues off the Playing Field: Subject
To Antitrust Law ........................................................
56
a. The Sports Broadcasting Act After Motorola:
A Shell of Its Former Self ....................................
57
b. An Historical Framework for Considering
Sports Information Providers ..............................
58
i. The NBA in the Consumer Product Market ..... 59
ii. The Public Interest in the Locus of Control
Over the Facts of Sporting Events ................. 61
c. Horizontal Agreements: Applying the
Antitrust Laws to League-Sponsored
Pagers and On-Line Services ............................... 63
i. The Legal Background ....................................
63
ii. The Factual Analysis .......................................
64
III. Saving the Sports Leagues: A Legislative Proposal .............. 67
A. Outlining the Proposal ......................................................
67
1. The Federal Misappropriation Statute ...................... 69
2. The Compulsory License Provision ...........................
72
B. Justifying the Proposal ......................................................
75
1. The Goals of Copyright Law ......................................
75
2. The Goals of the First Amendmentand the
Fair Use Doctrine ........................................................
76
3. The Goals of Antitrust Law ......................................
76
C. Likely Impact of the Proposal on the Leagues,
the Fans, and the Pager Producers and
On-Line Service Providers .................................................
77
1. Impact on the Sports Leagues ....................................
77
2. Impact on the Fans .....................................................
77
3. Impact on the Pager Producers and On-Line
Service Providers ........................................................
78
IV . Conclusion .................................................................................
79

2000]

NBA V. MOTOROLA: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

Introduction
In National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.,' the Second
Circuit held that, under federal copyright law,2 the facts of a
professional sporting event may be appropriated by a commercial
pager company and a commercial on-line service without infringing
upon any rights of the professional sports league or the teams
participating in the contest.' Furthermore, the court said that, due to
4
the preemptive nature of the American copyright scheme, states may
not legislate to protect facts which are exempt from federal copyright
protection unless those facts fall within a very limited "hot news"
exception which might implicate a state law misappropriation claim.6
However, the exception to federal copyright law preemption for a
state law "hot news" misappropriation claim is limited to cases where:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use of the
information constitutes free riding on a plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the
defendant is in direct competition with a product or service offered
by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on
the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to
1. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1996).
3. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846 ("[T]he underlying basketball games do not fall within
the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they do not constitute 'original
works of authorship' under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).").
4. Section 301 of the Federal Copyright Act reads:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
Section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether
published or unpublished, are governed by this title ....
17 U.S.C. § 301.
5. Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (holding
that only those aspects of a work which constitute an author's originality or expression
may be copyrightable, and that no author may copyright facts or ideas).
6. This "hot news" exception survives from an eighty-year old case, Intl. News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS], and avoids preemption because
it is not within the general scope of federal copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 106, as required by
17 U.S.C. § 301. See INS, 105 F.3d at 850; see also supra n. 4. In the early years of this
century, and especially during World War I, INS would take the factual stories written and
distributed by the AP on the east coast and transmit those stories to INS subscribers on
the west coast, many of which were commercial newspapers competing with newspapers
that subscribed to the AP. The Court found that the AP had a quasi-property right in the
news, enforceable against misappropriation by commercial competitors but not against
any conduct of the general public, such that INS's conduct was a common law
misappropriation of AP's property. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at
242).
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produce the product or service that its existence or quantity would
be substantially threatened.7
According to the Second Circuit, neither the Motorola hand-held
pager nor the America Online ("AOL") computer dial-up service fell
within this "hot news" exception.8
The Second Circuit's holding in Motorola misunderstands the
nature of the economic world in which the sports industry operates.
Sports leagues are fundamentally unique entities, unparalleled not
only in contemporary American society, but also in the competitive
economic marketplace in which they operate. A failure by any court
to consider each of these aspects in an analysis of the legal issues
affecting the sports industry risks substantial harm to the public's
interest in the continuing operation and success of the professional
sports leagues.
Part I of this Article examines the Second Circuit's decision in
detail. Part II looks at the Motorola decision from the perspective of
the public interest, in light of the doctrinal and policy views
surrounding copyright law, the First Amendment (and its
embodiment in the copyright doctrine of fair use) and antitrust law.
Part III proposes a limited federal misappropriation statute, placed
within the text of the Copyright Act, and an accompanying
compulsory license provision. Part IV concludes with a brief
discussion of the state of the marketplace for real-time information in
the wake of the Second Circuit's decision, and reemphasizes the harm
that Motorola does to the sports leagues and to the public interest,
whom would all be better served by the legislation proposed herein.
I
Overview of National Basketball Association v. Motorola
We start with an examination of the copyright and common law
misappropriation issues decided in Motorola, especially as the Second
Circuit's conclusions pertaining to those concepts differed from those
of the lower court 9 and other courts that, unlike the Second Circuit,
7. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845, 852.
8. Id. at 853 (finding that the collection and retransmission of strictly factual
material by the Motorola SportsTrax pager had no competitive effect as a substitute for
attending NBA games, watching them on television, or listening to the games on the radio,
and that there was no free-riding by SportsTrax with respect to any of the real-time facts
transmitted to the pagers. Since the components of a "hot news" misappropriation claim

are joined by a conjunctive, a failure to satisfy any one necessary requirement eliminates
the misappropriation claim altogether).
9. See Natl. Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Natl. Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105
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properly considered the special needs and status of the sports

industry. Motorola's conclusion, that the facts underlying sporting
events are not copyrightable, was incorrect as a matter of law and
ignores persuasive judicial precedent.
Although the court's statement that the Copyright Act preempts
any state legislation of facts is a critical component, if not the primary
novel aspect of its holding, pre-existing literature has already
examined this finding. Because this Paper acknowledges doubts as to
the propriety of the Second Circuit's preemption analysis as
expressed by other authors," and because the legislative proposal

outlined in Part III includes a federal misappropriation statute with
respect to the facts underlying sporting events that would itself

preempt any equivalent state misappropriation legislation, the Second
Circuit's preemption analysis will not be addressed here.
A. The Second Circuit Decision: A Critique
1.

Are Sporting Events Copyrightable?

Many of the Second Circuit's statements with respect to federal
copyright law are suspect and merit close scrutiny. The court found
that federal copyright law only preempts state misappropriation law
as it pertains to the broadcast of the athletic event, because although

the broadcast is copyrightable,'2 the facts of the underlying sporting
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). Note that the district court found only a violation of New York
State misappropriation law, on which claim the court entered a permanent injunction
against Motorola and Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc. ("STATS"), the
supplier of game information to, and administrator of, the America Online ("AOL")
computer dial-up service, enjoining the transmission of scores or other data about NBA
games in progress in the absence of authorization by the NBA and NBA Properties, Inc.
Motorola, 105 F.3d at 843.
10. See generally Katherine F. Horvath, NBA v. Motorola: A Case for Federal
Preemption of Misappropriation?,73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 461 (1998) (arguing that the
Second Circuit in Motorola incorrectly analyzed federal preemption of state
misappropriation laws, because misappropriation does not address rights equivalent to
those given in the Copyright Act, but instead regulates the "use" of material wholly apart
from any copying of that material).
11. See id. at 471-475 (comparing Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), with Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973), to distinguish between patent cases, where
protection has never been found in state law, with copyright cases, where state law
protection has been found, thereby justifying the application of state misappropriation
laws to copyright cases like Motorola).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (including within its definition of a "fixed" work, as required
for copyright protection under §102(a), a work that "consists of sounds, images, or both,
that are being transmitted .. . if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with
its transmission"). The simultaneous fixation requirement supposes a taping of a sporting
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events are not. 3 The Second Circuit cited no cases directly stating that

the facts underlying sporting events are not copyrightable, looking to
a treatise 4 and a case pertaining to a parade. 5
The court also ignored the NBA's reliance on a Seventh Circuit
opinion which explicitly stated that "[p]layers' performances [contain
the] modest creativity required for copyrightability."' 6 In fact, two
earlier cases explicitly found the facts underlying sporting events to
be copyrightable. 7 Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services

Co.' 8 was decided by the Supreme Court in 1991, subsequent to both
cases holding that the facts derived from sporting events are
copyrightable, and it did not concern the unique world of professional
sports, unlike each of the earlier cases, which were precisely
concerned with the sporting context.
2. Does The "Hot News" Exception Apply?

The court's holding that Motorola's facts did not satisfy the "hot
news" exception of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press'9

rested, in part, on the lack of any free-riding by Motorola or Sports
Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc. ("STATS," which supplied

information to, and was administrator for, the America Online
event contemporaneous with the broadcast of the game. Congress specifically considered
sporting events when it added the above described portion of § 101. See Motorola, 105
F.3d at 847 (citing H.R. No. 94-1476 at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5665).
13. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846 (finding that a basketball game and the facts therefrom
do not constitute "original works of authorship" as required for the subject matter of
copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)); see also supra n. 5.
14. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846 (citing Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright, vol. 1 § 2.09(F) at 2-170.1 (1996)).
15. Id. (citing ProductionContractors,Inc. v. WGN ContinentalBroadcasting Co., 622
F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. I11.
1985), which held that a Christmas parade is not a work of
authorship entitled to copyright protection).
16. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 669
n.7 (7th Cir. 1986).
17. See id.; see also Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV BroadcastingCo., 24 F. Supp. 490,
492 (W.D. Pa. 1938); see also discussion infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
18. 499 U.S. at 350; see supra n. 5.
19. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. Although the INS decision has been
much maligned over the last eighty years, see Horvath, supra n. 10, at 470 (citing Judge
Learned Hand's leadership of the attack on the INS misappropriation doctrine in cases
like Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,280 (2d Cir. 1929), and R.C.A. Mfg. Co.
v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1951)), it continues to survive and has been cited by
the Supreme Court relatively recently. See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987)
(upholding a property right in confidential business information, where a brokerage firm
misappropriated information from a column in The Wall Street Journal prior to
publication, thereby depriving the newspaper of its "right to decide how to use [the
information] prior to disclosing it to the public").
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computer dial-up service) in the collection, transmission, and
assembling of the real-time information. The court, in dictum, said
that if Motorola and STATS had gotten their facts from a sports
pager marketed by the NBA, there would have been free-riding due
to the effort exerted by the NBA to assemble and transmit the data. 0
However, because the information was gathered by watching NBAlicensed television broadcasts, no such free-riding occurred. These
arguments ignore the efforts undertaken by the league to produce the
underlying games, and to license the broadcast or cable transmission
of those games from which the facts were appropriated by the
defendants. 2' The Motorola court's analysis of free-riding is
unnecessarily limited, and a correct analysis of the true competitive
atmosphere in which sports pagers are marketed and sold would have
led to an affirmation of the District Court's approval of the NBA's
misappropriation claim.
The Second Circuit rested its reversal of the lower court's finding
on the cases following INS which indicate that only direct competition
resulting from a defendant's appropriation in the plaintiff's primary
market will be sufficient to constitute free-riding, which is part and
parcel of a misappropriation claim.22 In explaining the primary
market, the court cited National Football League v. Governor of State
23 in which a district court differentiated the primary
of Delaware,

market from "collateral services generated by the success of one's
business venture."24 In the context of the Motorola case, the Second
Circuit said that, because Motorola did not obtain its information
from an NBA pager which was in direct competition with its own
pager, two essential elements of an INS misappropriation claim (freeriding, and a directly competing product) were absent. On the basis
of this finding, the court concluded that the development and
marketing of a pager by Motorola could not be condemned simply
because its demand arose out of fan interest in real-time knowledge
of the events of professional basketball games.

20. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 854.
21. See id. at 853 (stating that "generating the information by playing the games" and
"transmitting live, full descriptions of those games" are the "primary business[es]" of the
NBA).
22. See id. at 852, n. 8 ("Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are almost always
rejected when the appropriation does not intrude upon the plaintiff's primary market."
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. c)).
23. 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
24. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 852 n. 8.
25. See supra text accompanying n. 7.

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

B.

[23:29

Defining the Relevant Market: A Broader View of Direct Competition

The Second Circuit's analysis of the competitive marketplace was
inexplicably and unreasonably narrow, and ignored the realities of the
relevant market for real-time information about sporting events. The
court defined the NBA's primary business as "producing basketball
games with live attendance and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of
those games. 26 In rejecting any direct competition by the Motorola
pager with the activities of the NBA, the court gave no weight to the
possibility of competition with the NBA's licensed copyrighted
broadcasts. Fans who are either unable or unwilling to attend the live
performance of those games but want real-time information on the
contest have the option of listening to over-the-air or cable telecasts
or broadcasts of the games, or obtaining the same information
through fee-for-service pagers and on-line services. Although it is
almost certainly true that the SportsTrax pagers do not compete
directly with live attendance of NBA games, it seems likely that such
pagers compete directly with other media for the market's demand
for real-time information of the facts of sporting events as the games
unfold.
Motorola and STATS might argue that their respective pager
and on-line services are marketed not only to fans in the local viewing
or listening area who have easy access to free real-time accounts of
the games, but also to those fans in more remote locations who are
outside of their favorite team's broadcast range, such as a Boston
Celtics enthusiast who has relocated to another part of the country. It
seems, however, that most every pager owner would be within the
broadcast or telecast area of at least one, and probably more, of the
professional sports teams (especially given that some networks, like
the Atlanta-based Turner Broadcasting System, broadcast the games
of local sports teams throughout the nation). As long as the services
offered by Motorola and STATS provide information about a
subscriber's local sports teams, some amount of direct competition
with the broadcasts or telecasts of a professional sports franchise
occurs. Furthermore, it seems likely that most fans who buy pagers
for the primary purpose of getting real-time Celtic game updates live
in or near the Boston area, and therefore, have access to the Celtics'
properly licensed telecasts and broadcasts.
The most likely candidate for direct competition in the product
market is between sports pagers and radio broadcasts. The benefits of
a sports pager include not only its rapid delivery of information about
26.

Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853; see supra n. 21.
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the ongoing events of a game, but also the covert conveyance of that
information. It is easy to imagine workers in offices around the
country, sports pagers at the ready, secretly checking their favorite
player's points total for that day's game. The sports pager can
perform the same function as a portable radio, but with less
intrusiveness - although, for a greater price. Children who want to
catch the early innings of a late-season series involving their favorite
team can now use the more subtle pager-in-pocket method. Although
the idea that the voices of Vin Scully or the late Mel Allen are being
replaced by the electronic pixels of a hand held pager may be
revolting to sports traditionalists, the fact that this very situation
undoubtedly exists was ignored by the Second Circuit.
If the relevant market were properly defined to include all
products with which the Motorola pager directly competes, the
Second Circuit should have arrived at a different result with respect
to the "hot news" misappropriation claim. Three elements essential to
an INS claim, namely free-riding, direct competition, and threats to
the existence of the primary product, are inextricably interlinked, and
a proper - albeit more expansive - reading of the facts of the case
show that the NBA's misappropriation claim should have been
upheld.
The first two elements, free-riding and direct competition, have
already been discussed." The third element, the threat posed to the
existence of sports leagues and their licensed broadcasts by the
delivery of real-time information from sporting events without any
compensation for the sports leagues, presents the greatest risk of
damage to the public interest. Although the Second Circuit stated
that, "[i]n our view, the NBA has failed to show any
[anti-]competitive effect whatsoever from SportsTrax" that adversely
impacts upon the quantity of information generated from the playing
of basketball games, or upon incentives for the NBA to transmit live,
full descriptions of sporting events in real-time," the findings of the
district court refute this claim. Rather, Judge Preska of the Southern
District of New York found that, by appropriating the information
from games conducted under the NBA's auspices, Motorola was able
to "reap... profits from [the] NBA's most valued asset - real-time
NBA game information."29 The district court made the factual
finding, which the Second Circuit repudiated without basis, that:
27. See discussion accompanying parts I.A.2, IB, supra.
28. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853.
29. Natl. Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F.
Supp. at 1105 (citing National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768-70 (N.Y. Sup.
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SportsTrax and STATS' AOL site erode [the] NBA's ability to
approach other commercial entities... and offer them the degree
of exclusivity in real-time depictions of NBA games that it could

offer in the absence of these products. Thus, defendants' products
have affected adversely the value of [the] NBA's real-time game

information. °
The Second Circuit gave no convincing statement in support of
its choice to ignore the factual findings of the district court, which
properly evaluated the competitive damage to the NBA beyond the
limited context of the electronic pager market. Judge Preska found
that pager and on-line services which provide real-time information
from sporting events threaten the continued existence of the
traditional, exclusively licensed radio and television broadcasts - an
essential element of an INS misappropriation claim.
C.

The Public Interest in Protecting the Sports Leagues

Consider the harm to the public interest if, the fans are deprived

of free access to real-time game information. If the value to
broadcasters of a license to transmit a play-by-play account of the
event is decreased, as Judge Preska suggested, then the danger arises
that the leagues will cease to benefit from the effort expended to
license those broadcasts - the NBA's "most valued asset."31 Taken to
its extreme, the very survival of the leagues will be threatened. If the
percentage of sports leagues' revenues from broadcasting contracts
remains as high as it currently stands,32 it is easy to see how the
continued destruction of a primary source of revenue might endanger
the other primary asset of the sports league: the sporting event itself.
The Second Circuit's opinion has significant implications not
only for the existence, operation, and profitability of the National
Basketball Association, but for all professional sports. The impact of
the Motorola decision for pagers conveying information on anything
from the New York Stock Exchange to the gross receipts of motion

pictures is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worthwhile to

Ct. 1955), where an independent news gatherer who listened to play-by-play broadcasts of
New York Giants baseball games and sent out simultaneous teletype reports of the games
to radio stations for immediate rebroadcast was found to have misappropriated the
commercial value of the information generated from the games).
30. STATS, 939 F. Supp. at 1106.
31. See supra, n. 29, and accompanying text.
32. See Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law ch. 6C (2d ed. 1998)
(attributing more than two-thirds of the revenue of the National Football League, more
than 40 percent of the revenues of the NBA and Major League Baseball, and more than
20 percent of the revenue of the National Hockey League to broadcasting contracts).
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consider whether there might be differences in regard to varying
characteristics of sporting events.
Consider first the example of Major League Baseball. In
particular, would the slower pace of baseball, accompanied by its
long-standing tradition of radio and television broadcasts, cause a
court to arrive at a different result on a state law misappropriation
claim?33 The paging device at issue in Motorola operated in four
different modes. The mode in dispute was the "current" mode, in
which the pager would display a number of statistics pertaining to the
progress of professional basketball games, including "(i) the teams
playing; (ii) score changes; (iii) the team in possession of the ball; (iv)
whether the team is in the free throw bonus; (v) the quarter of the
game; and (vi) time remaining in the quarter."' There exists a similar
pager for baseball enthusiasts which conveys such information as (i)
teams playing; (ii) team at bat; (iii) inning of play; (iv) score of the
game; (v) number of outs; (vi) men on base; (vii) pitch count; (viii)
statistics of the player due up (both for the season to date, and in the
previous at bats of the particular game being played); and (ix) the
projected, current, winning, losing, and game-saving pitchers.35 The
speed of a professional baseball game - or, as is frequently argued,
the lack thereof3 6 - makes the sport particularly amenable to a pager
which can convey discrete chunks of information at regular intervals.37
There is nothing in the Motorola decision limiting its application
to basketball, to professional sports, or even to sports generally. In
fact, if anything, the Second Circuit intends its holding to be applied
broadly, encompassing not only sports pagers but also STATS and
other services that make available the information from sporting

33. Although Major League Baseball has granted a license for SportsTrax to operate
during and after professional baseball games, see id., this discussion is still useful as an
analytic tool, as well as for the practical reason that licenses are revocable by the grantor.
34. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 844.
35. Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products <http://www.mot.com/MIMS/
MSPG/Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (visited Mar. 13, 1998).
36. See Tom Singer, Baseball 2000: After More Than a Century of Prosperity, the
Grand Old Game Lost Its Luster and Would Be Wise to Change with the Times, Sport
Magazine 82 (June 1995) ("The First Commandment of any think-tank for the
preservation of baseball is to trash the dead time and quicken the action.").
37. The Motorola-produced ESPN TO GO Sports Information Receiver, updates
NFL, NHL, and Major League Baseball Games, and NCAA Division I basketball and
football games every five minutes, updates NBA scores every three minutes of game time,
and updates professional golf (PGA, Senior PGA, and Ladies PGA) leaderboards once an
hour. Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products <http://www.mot.com/MIMS/MSPG/
Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (visited Mar. 13, 1998).
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events in real-time.38 A later version of the sports pager produced by
Motorola, the ESPN To Go Sports Information Receiver, was
advertised as offering "Portable, Wireless, Virtual Real-Time Sports
Information from ESPN, The Worldwide Leader in Sports."39 In

addition to periodic updates on basketball games, it offered updates
on baseball, pro and college football, professional hockey, and the
Senior, Ladies', and Men's professional golf tours. 0 Arguably,
professional hockey and golf are not as amenable to real-time sports
updates. In fact, golf leader boards are updated only once every hour,
and NHL updates are limited to information on score updates
(current score, with a list of who scored and assisted on each goal),
time updates, and end of game shots on goal statistics. However, the
Second Circuit's analysis should have differed given the special
treatment afforded professional sports in the American business and
legal landscape.
D. Treating Sports as a Special Industry
1. Baseball

For reasons not entirely clear, American courts have treated
professional sports as a unique institution, and they have afforded the
entities that comprise the major professional leagues preferential
treatment against legal challenges to their operations and existence.
Major League Baseball presents the quintessential example of the
preferential treatment of a sports league by the courts. Although the
most obvious manifestation of this bias toward the sport historically
known as America's "national pastime"" concerns baseball's antitrust
exemption, announced in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League,2 favorable judicial treatment of major league
baseball exists in other contexts as well.
Most applicable to the present case is Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.

38. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 844 ("[W]e regard the legal issues as identical with
respect to both products, and our holding applies equally to SportsTrax and STATS AOL
site.").
39. Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products <http://www.mot.com/MIMS/
MSPG/Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (visited Mar. 13, 1998).
40. See supra n. 37.
41. See, e.g., Howard Rothman, All That Once Was Good: Inside America's National
Pastime (1995) (a behind-the-scenes look at the business of baseball in the 1990s, focusing
on the recent expansion team, the Colorado Rockies); Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball and
Billions:A ProbingLook Inside the Big Business of Our National Pastime (1992).
42. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); infra nn. 172-173 and accompanying text.
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KQV BroadcastingCo.,4 a sixty-year old district court case that found
it "perfectly clear that the exclusive right to broadcast play-by-play
descriptions of the games played by [a professional sports team] at
their home field rests in [that team]."" Although the date and court of
decision of the PittsburghAthletic case makes the opinion limited in
precedential value and not at all binding upon the Second Circuit, it
nevertheless remains the most on-point discussion of the issues
present in Motorola. The Supreme Court, in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward BroadcastingCo.," cited PittsburghAthletic as support for its
holding that the First Amendment does not "privilege respondent
[broadcasting company] ... to film and broadcast a prize fight.., or a

baseball game.., where the promoters or the participants had other
plans for publicizing the event., 46 Similarly, it was a baseball case,
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball PlayersAssociation,
in which the Seventh Circuit stated that the facts of player
performances have sufficient creativity to merit copyright
protection. It hardly seems inappropriate to conclude, then, that the
Motorola court should have arrived at a different result upon a
proper consideration of professional sports as a special industry.
2.

Football

Cases involving the National Football League also portray the
historically favorable treatment of professional sports leagues by the
American courts. The NFL "situation reports" provided by the
Motorola pager are as extensive as those given for professional
baseball and basketball. The ESPN To Go Sports Information
Receiver provides a variety of real-time information on football
games, updated every five minutes, including: (i) down and yards to
go; (ii) quarter and time remaining; (iii) major plays on each drive;
and (iv) scoring plays, with information on who scored and how.48
One scholar, Professor John Weistart of Duke University Law
School, makes the ironic suggestion that the very absence of an
antitrust exemption for professional football may lead to court

43. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
44. Id. at 492.
45. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
46. Id. at 575 (internal citations omitted); see also National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports
Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd sub
nom., National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
47. See text accompanying supra n. 16.
48. See Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products, <http://www.mot.com/MIMS/
MSPG/Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (accessed Mar. 13,1998).
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judgments in the favor of the NFL and its member teams.49 He cites,
as his primary example, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission
v. National Football League,"° in which the Ninth Circuit found that
the NFL was not a single entity for antitrust purposes, so that the
NFL teams were subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and did not
enjoy any non-statutory antitrust exemption.51 Despite the rejection
of single entity status for the NFL, Professor Weistart points out that
"[t]he court's later analysis does agree that leagues can exercise
control over franchise locations."52 He offers as an explanation for
this soft stance on an otherwise apparent antitrust violation "the
court's acceptance that a proper goal of league franchise controls is to
ensure the financial stability of the clubs involved."53 Unlike the court
in Motorola, the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Coliseum properly
considered that the professional sports industry merits a greater
deference and latitude, even within such a traditionally hard legal
doctrine as antitrust law, than the typical production or service
industry.
The most recent Supreme Court case involving professional
sports, the landmark antitrust and labor law decision of Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc. , approved of the NFL's conduct in imposing fixed
salaries upon developmental squad players after an impasse in
collective bargaining.5 In a context more closely related to the issues
in Motorola, respecting the rights of professional sports leagues to
convey information about the sporting events they arrange, the
Second Circuit in United States Football League v. National Football
League56 held that "the mere existence of the NFL contracts with the
three [television] networks does not violate the antitrust laws,"57 and

thereby affirmed a trial court verdict denying a challenge to the
49. See John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities:A Perspective on
Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 Duke L.J. 1013, 1014-1027
(1984).
50. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
51. Weistart, supra n. 49, at 1014-27.
52. Id. at 1027.
53. Id.
54. 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (holding that unilateral action, upon impasse, of the various
pro football teams subsequent to collective bargaining agreement negotiations fell within
the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
55. See id. at 248 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 10102 (1984), for the oft-noted position that some cooperation by sports teams is necessary in
order to place the competitive product of sporting events into the consumer marketplace);
see also infra part II(C)(1).
56. 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1355.
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NFL's broadcasting practices by an upstart, and now defunct,
professional football league. 8
Even some cases which have found against the NFL have
referred to professional football specifically, and sports generally, as
an industry with unusual characteristics. In Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc.," the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
the NFL draft system to be sufficiently anticompetitive, under the
rule of reason, such that it failed antitrust scrutiny and violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' In doing so, however, the court
discussed such attributes of football as the absence of true
competition among members of a professional sports joint venture,"
and the anticompetitive effects of the NFL draft.62 Most notably, the
court stated that "professional football [and professional sports
in
63
general] may differ significantly from other business services.,
The critical consideration of the uniqueness of professional
sports as an industry which must, by its nature, control its product's
creation and distribution, was neglected by the Second Circuit in
Motorola. Had the court considered the public interest in supporting
the business of professional sports, the NBA's attempts to halt the
misappropriation of its information by a private pager company
should have succeeded, as they did in the district court. Just as the
public treats professional sports as a special industry, occupying a
singular place in the hearts and minds of sports fans everywhere, so
should the courts. The Motorola court's failure to do so led it to
neglect important public policy justifications for protecting the
information, property, and profit motives of the NBA.
II
NBA v. Motorola: In the Public Interest?
The Second Circuit misread the historical policies behind
copyright doctrine, considering copyright as a regulatory concept
rather than one embedded with notions favoring the protection of
property from appropriation by economic competitors. Furthermore,
58. Id. at 1379.
59. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
60. See id. at 1188-89.
61. See id. at 1178-79 ("[T]he NFL clubs which have 'combined' to implement the
draft are not competitors in any economic sense.").
62. See id. at 1185 ("The draft inescapably forces each seller of football services to
deal with one, and only one buyer, robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of
any real bargaining power.").
63. Id. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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had the court taken a proper look at the implications of the First
Amendment (especially as it impacts upon the notion of fair use
codified in the federal copyright legislation) and antitrust law, it
might have recognized that the public's interest in the survival of
sports leagues enjoys doctrinal support within those subject areas.
A. Copyright
1.

The DoctrinalDebate:PropertyRights Versus Regulation of Distribution

The Copyright Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for
limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their writings.""
A fundamental tension has been recognized in scholarly works which
question whether the overriding concern of the copyright clause is

best served by providing incentives for the creation of "writings," or
rather by ensuring the dissemination of works after their creation.65
Professor L. Ray Patterson, of the University of Georgia Law School,
has phrased the issue as "whether copyright is essentially a
proprietary or a regulatory concept." 66 He suggests that, we must ask
which vision better serves the universally accepted purpose of
copyright law - the promotion of learning. 67 The courts have likewise

adopted the conceptual view of a duality of proprietary versus
regulatory aspects of copyright protection.68
The Second Circuit, in Motorola, quite clearly treated copyright

as a regulatory concept. It found that there had been no infringement
of any copyright held by the NBA because "the SportsTrax device

64.

8.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.

65. Compare Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of
Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 370 (1992)
(advocating a federal misappropriation statute, passed under Congress' Commerce Clause
power, to overcome the fact/expression dichotomy announced in Feist), with L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1987) (arguing
that the purpose of the Copyright Clause is to provide for the distribution of copyright
works, despite the protection that courts typically award to the creator of a work).
66. Patterson, supra n. 65, at 6.

67. See id.
68. See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d
1471, 1478 (11th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal
dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992), in which the Eleventh Circuit stated:
Copyright's basis as a proprietary concept is that it enables one to protect his or
her own creations. Its regulatory basis is that when these creations constitute the
expression of ideas presented to the public, they become part of the stream of
information whose unimpeded flow is critical to a free society.
Id. (quoting Patterson, supra n. 65, at 5).
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and AOL site reproduce only factual information culled from the
broadcasts and none of the copyrightable expression."" Since the
court put its focus on the free distribution of the facts of the sporting
event, "the regulatory nature of copyright follows logically because
distribution requires regulation."7°
The nature of the American regulatory scheme, as enumerated
by the Constitution and the laws promulgated thereunder, is to define
the scope and limits of restrictions on the free distribution of
information, including the facts underlying sporting events. The
Supreme Court, in the landmark copyright cases of Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.7 and Harper & Row Publishers,

Inc. v. Nation Enterprises," held as constitutional only that copyright
law which protects works or portions of works incorporating the
expression of the author, and not the protection of any facts or ideas
contained therein. The scope of federal copyright was therefore held
to fall short of providing property-like protection to those underlying
facts or ideas.73
2.

PropertyRights: Preferredfor the Promotionof Learning

Despite the strong opinion of the Second Circuit, it is unclear
whether the notion of copyright ought to be one confined by
regulations. This Article suggests that the proprietary concept of
copyright is best suited for the promotion of learning. The
constitutional goal of promoting learning as a public good can be
accomplished by focusing on the strength of incentives for the
creation of works,74 rather than on the distribution of works already
69. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847 (affirming the decision of the district court, which
rejected the NBA's claim of copyright infringement by defendants Motorola and STATS).
70. Patterson, supra n. 65, at 6.
71. 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (holding that a white pages telephone directory is not
copyrightable as a compilation because it only embodies facts, not expression, and does
not exhibit the sufficient creativity in selection that is required for copyright protection);
see Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 345.
72. 723 F.2d 195, 200 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1984) (finding that
even uncopyrightable material is within the subject matter protected by the federal
Copyright Act, and therefore any state regulation of material not meeting federal
standards of copyright is preempted under § 301 of the Act).
73. Note, however, that Horvath, supra n. 10, at 478-79, cites Feist as support for her
argument that state misappropriation laws covering the facts underlying sporting events
should not be preempted. Horvath concludes that the Supreme Court's exclusion of such
facts from the scope of protection of the Copyright Act impliedly leaves room for state
regulation.
74. See Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 341 (stating that Feist neglects the constitutional goal
of providing incentive for innovation and creativity by eliminating protection for works
produced by the "sweat of the brow" of the creator).
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created. "The traditional view [is] that the constitutional purpose of
copyright is best served by encouraging the creation of works."75
Scholars have likewise noted that "the federal government already
has tried to regulate sports broadcasting, and has failed miserably ....
Nothing suggests that efforts to regulate would be any more effective
today."76

Professor Jane C. Ginsburg, of Columbia Law School, articulates
the two most significant rationales for favoring the proprietary
conception of copyright by explaining how the Feist Court's
regulatory view is contrary to the constitutional purpose of the
Copyright Clause. First, Professor Ginsburg says that "free-riding on
previously gathered information" is encouraged by a lack of
protection for the results of creative efforts.77 Second, she says that

"Feist neglects another, at least as important, constitutional goal: to
provide incentives to the creation of works so that knowledge will
progress."78 Although she agrees with the concept, eventually the
basis of the Second Circuit's opinion in Motorola, that state law
protection of such facts "may very well be preempted, and at any rate
is not desirable in an interstate information market,"7 9 she disagrees,
however, that the Constitution bars, without qualification, the
creation of non-copyright protection of information.
a.

No Such Thing as a Free Ride

The free-riding that Professor Ginsburg claims is implicitly
endorsed by the Feist Court is precisely the problem with the
Motorola decision. Motorola and STATS make a minimal effort in
gathering information to distribute via their pager and on-line

services; they make no effort whatsoever in producing the games, or
75. Patterson, supra n. 65, at 7 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Harper
& Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1984); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
76. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 712-714 (1989)
(arguing that the government should break up two of the four major American sports
leagues - namely, Major League Baseball and the National Football League - in order to
force teams to operate as distinct economic entities and increase competition).
77. See Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 341.
78. Id. at 341; see id. at 360 ("It is worth noting that survival of a state information
protection claim based on its non-equivalence to a copyright claim may encourage
limitation of access to the information."); cf. Dinita Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal
Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1998, § 2, at 1, 9
(claiming that the grant of a copyright "for limited times" was the Founding Fathers' way
to balance the competing constitutional goals of "protecting the rights of artists and their
heirs" and "the need to allow the public free access to works of art and literature").
79. Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 341.
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in licensing those games for broadcast on television or radio.
Professor Ginsburg properly points out, in the course of arguing
against the preemption of state or federal misappropriation
protection for information, that improper or illegal access is not a
necessary prerequisite to copyright infringement.0 Similarly, it is not
Motorola's or STATS' method of acquiring information, in and of
itself, that is objectionable. The idea that commercial competitors can
free-ride upon the professional sports league's efforts to supply the
human, physical, and financial capital, and reap profits while bearing
very little of the associated risks and costs, is what is so offensive to
the traditional notion of a distribution of rewards commensurate with
effort undertaken.
The argument that ancillary services, such as out-of-stadium
pretzel vendors and nearby taverns, similarly free-ride upon the
presence and operation of professional ball clubs8' does not eviscerate
the principle that works of even a modest level of creativity should be
protected in order to halt free-riding and to provide incentives for
those responsible for creating the works in the first place. This is so
even if such protection may sometimes be at the incidental expense of
curtailing distribution of information to the public.82
b. Protecting the Economic Incentives

The incentive to create is the second justification that Professor
Ginsburg presents to support her view that, under the Copyright
Clause, Congress should be free to provide protection for facts and
other discrete pieces of information if it so chooses. Efforts exerted
by the NBA and all sports leagues to arrange, promote, conduct, and
distribute their games create value for the leagues and their member
teams. The value of radio and television broadcast contracts is
threatened by the entrance of competing sports pagers and on-line
80. Id. at 359 ("[lIndeed, no showing of illicit access is required to establish a
copyright violation.").
81. See Horvath, supra n. 10, at 483 ("While courts have recognized that one has a
right to one's own harvest, this proposition has not been construed to preclude others
from profiting from demands for collateral services generated by the success of one's
business venture." (quoting NFL v. Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977)).
Horvath pointed out, however, that unlike the situation in Motorola, the District Court of
Delaware, in finding that the State of Delaware was not misappropriating factual
information from NFL games, "relied on the fact that the information from the games was
used after the NFL had disseminated game facts to the public at large and no longer
expected financial gain from the information.").
82. Cf. Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 387 ("Ironically, the elimination of 'sweat' copyright
may require information providers to restrict access ... in order to maintain a contractual
or technological hold on the material.").
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services into the consumer electronics marketplace. The court in
Motorola did not dispute the copyright protection afforded to
broadcasts of professional sporting events.83 However, if the NBA is
not afforded protection for the information arising from sporting
events for the duration of those events, any competing company will
be able to appropriate that information for distribution to the public
in real-time without compensation to the leagues.
Much of the revenue earned by teams in professional sports
leagues comes from local or league-wide broadcasting contractsY8 As
the proliferation of fans with sports pagers and/or access to on-line
services increases, radio listenership and, to a lesser degree, television
viewership, will likely fall proportionally. Instead of turning on the
radio or the television to witness the progression of the day's games,
people will have access to all of the same information through a handheld pager device or a flat-fee on-line computer information service.
If listeners and viewers defect from traditional media outlets,
correspondingly fewer dollars will be spent by television and radio
broadcasters to receive licenses to broadcast professional sports as
the predicted advertising revenue from these broadcasts declines. The
value of these licenses inheres in their exclusivity. If restrictions on
the transmission of the facts of the underlying games on a real-time
schedule are removed, the incentive to pay for the licenses is gone.
Leagues and teams may falter as their broadcast licensing
revenues decline, especially if there is an absence of a corresponding
decrease in the costs of conducting the business of professional sports.
This is especially true for smaller market teams in leagues, which do
not share revenues to any substantial degree. Consider the
importance of economics to the success of Major League Baseball
teams. In 1997, the teams with the five highest payrolls in baseball all
made the post-season playoffs, leaving only three spots for the other
23 teams.85 The highest payroll in the major leagues, that of the New
York Yankees, exceeded $70 million, and was made possible in large
part by the $468 million, 12-year local television contract that the
team signed with the Madison Square Garden television network in
1989.6 The importance of broadcast rights is in no way limited to

83. See discussion supra n. 12.
84. See supra n. 32.
85. See Tom Verducci, A Farewellto Skinny Arms, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 23, 1998,
at 68.
86. See Tom Verducci, Scouting Reports: New York Yankees: Too Much Is Enough,
Sports Illustrated, Mar. 23, 1998, at 93.
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Major League Baseball; the NFL reaps $1.1 billion from television
licensing contracts each year, amounting to $39 million per team.
Sandy Alderson, former president of the Oakland Athletics
baseball club, cited "the pressure of losing money" as a reason for the
team's mere $18 million payroll and its last place finish in the
American League West division in 1997.88 "We're a team trying to
compete on a businesslike basis," said Mr. Alderson.89 Jonathan
Mariner, Chief Financial Officer of the Florida Marlins, clearly
articulated the weighty challenge that the Marlins, the Athletics and
other small market teams face in the new era of sports economics:
"These days, an MLB team has to spend at least $45 million in player
payroll to have a chance to win; average team revenues are only $50
million."' The 1997 World Champion Florida Marlins lost $34 million
despite winning the league championship, according to team owner
H. Wayne Huizenga. In the months prior to the 1998 season, the
Marlins cut payroll to the extent that half of the championship roster
had been traded to other clubs, released, or not re-signed prior to
opening day.91

It is pure speculation, at this point, as to what degree sports
pagers have an adverse impact on the market for broadcast licenses
and, by extension, on the profitability and on-field competitiveness of
professional sports teams. Given the economics of the sports industry,
however, a continuing absence of protection from misappropriation
of the facts of sporting events during the duration of such events
might result in a decline in free over-the-air game broadcasts, a
decrease in the number of events being held, or both." Any of these
eventualities are so clearly damaging to the public interest that the
failure of courts to consider their possibility does the fan a great
disservice.

87. See Garry Emmons, Running Up the Score: Growth and Turmoil in the Business
of Sports, Harv. Bus. Sch. Bull., Feb. 1998, at 27.
88. See Tom Verducci, Scouting Reports: Oakland Athletics: A Commitment to
Mediocrity, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 23, 1998, at 148.
89. Id.
90. Emmons, supra n. 87, at 31 (interviewing Florida Marlins CFO Jonathan Mariner,
who claims that the lack of a salary cap in baseball allows "the richer teams [to]
substantially outspend smaller-market clubs").
91. See Michael Bamberger, Scouting Reports: Florida Marlins: Wait Till Last Year,
Sports Illustrated, Mar. 23, 1998, at 142.
92. See discussion infra Part III for a legislative proposal which hopes to correct or, to
the degree such problems have not yet been realized, avoid the dangers of the Second
Circuit's holding in Motorola.
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Free Speech: The First Amendment and Fair Use

The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in relevant part,
that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." 93 The Second Circuit, in Motorola, found that
the property right protection requested by the NBA for the
underlying facts of professional basketball games was contrary to the
policy goals of the Constitution's Copyright Clause - namely
"fostering the free flow, availability, and use of raw information." 94
However, the court never explicitly addressed First Amendment
concerns. This Article will briefly perform the analysis neglected by
the Second Circuit with respect to the applicability of First
Amendment doctrine to the facts of Motorola.
Although the First Amendment is not properly applied to this
case, the intellectual history behind certain areas of the doctrine are
useful in an analysis of "fair use" under the Copyright Act.9 In
particular, two doctrinal areas - private speech and commercial
speech - are pertinent. Each of these areas of constitutional law
questions whether the full protection of the First Amendment's
Speech and Press clauses is appropriate in all circumstances.
1. The FirstAmendment's Treatment of PrivateSpeech
The most significant "private speech" case is Dun & Bradstreetv.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.," in which the Supreme Court said that
speech on matters of private concern, while not totally unprotected
by the First Amendment, receives protection less complete than that
afforded to speech on matters of public concern. 97 The reason for this
lesser protection, is that restrictions on such speech pose "no threat to
the free and robust debate of public issues." 98 Other cases have also
referred to the "marketplace of ideas" as the intended beneficiary of
the First Amendment protections of free speech and press. In

93. U.S. Const. amend. I.
94. Note, Nothing But Internet, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1155 (1997) (supporting the
Second Circuit's decision in Motorola, and rejecting any "use of misappropriation doctrine
to justify enjoining the dissemination of real-time sports information").
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
96. 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985).
97. Id. at 759 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983), which held that a
District Attorney's office could fire an Assistant D.A. for speech that does not "touch
upon matters of public concern").
98. Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davisdon Motorsports,Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359,
1363 (Or. 1977)).
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particular, the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC," said:
[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. [It] is
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial.'°°
Although information about sporting events is not private on a
par with an individual's credit report, at issue in Dun & Bradstreet,
neither is it public in the same sense as information about public
officials 1 or public safety"° is public.
2.

The First Amendment's Treatment of Commercial Speech

The doctrine surrounding "commercial speech," defined as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience,"1 3 is likewise useful in analyzing the Copyright Act's
fair use provision. Although the facts of sporting events are of noneconomic interest to the average fan, they are clearly of value both to
the NBA and to those who would appropriate that information for
profit.
The watershed case in the area of commercial speech is Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc."
Reversing a trend exempting commercial speech from any First

99. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
100. Id. at 367 (upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine" which, until its 1987 repeal by
President Reagan, see In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987),
required broadcasters to grant individuals the right to reply to personal attacks broadcast
on their station, and the right to reply to the station's political editorials), in William B.
Lockhart et al., Constitutional Law 964-66 (7th ed. 1991); see also Paul C. Weiler,
Entertainment,Media, and the Law 935-939 (1997); cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public
issues." (quoting New York Times v.Sullivan, 376 U.S.254, 270 (1964))).
101. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 ("An individual who decides to seek governmental
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He
runs the risk of closer public scrutiny that might otherwise be the case.").
102. See FloridaStar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524 (1989) (striking down a Florida statute
that made unlawful the publication or broadcast via any instrument of mass
communication the name of a victim of a sexual offense, on the grounds that publication
of "truthful information about a matter of public significance" cannot be constitutionally
punished "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order" (quoting Smith v.
Daily Mail Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))).
103. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
104. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Amendment protection,"' the Virginia Pharmacy Court refused to

find that commercial advertising was speech wholly without value in
the marketplace of ideas. Instead, the Court held that commercial
speech "does not lose its First Amendment protection because money
is spent to project it."'"

Nevertheless, such commercial speech, like private speech,
enjoys a lesser First Amendment protection than does pure speech,
and it may be regulated. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission"° lays out a four part test to determine

whether a particular use of commercial speech may be regulated
despite the protection of the First Amendment. l"g First, if the speech
is misleading or concerns unlawful activity, it may be regulated
because it falls entirely outside of the First Amendment's sweep.1 9 If
it is not, then the level of the governmental interest in regulating the
commercial speech is considered.' If the interest can be considered
"substantial," then it is for the court to determine whether the
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and
whether the formulation is drawn no more broadly than is necessary
to serve that interest.' Again, although information from sporting
events cannot be considered commercial speech, as it is not
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience," the economic nature of the NBA's and Motorola's
business is relevant to the fair use inquiry, as is explained below."'

105. This trend was recognized by the Court one year earlier, in Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975), in which a conviction for violating a state statute that made the
circulation of publications encouraging abortions illegal was overturned. See Lockhart,
supra n. 100, at 839 n. a and accompanying text.
106. See Virginia Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 761.
107. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
108. See id. at 564; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
(upholding regulations of in-person solicitations by lawyers and noting that various forms
of commercial speech are regulated "without offending the First Amendment," including
the exchange of information about securities); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 883
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 375 (1970); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970) (upholding regulation of corporate proxy statements); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (upholding the prohibition of the exchange of
price and production information among competitors); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575 (1969) (prohibiting employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees).
109. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See discussion infra nn. 118-121 and accompanying text.
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Fair Use Doctrine:Free Speech Concerns Within Copyright Law

The fair use doctrine is the Copyright Act's tool for addressing
the principles of free speech as they come into conflict with the
copyright monopoly. "3 Codified in Section 107 of the Federal
Copyright Act,114 the doctrine of fair use is intended to grant a
"privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the
copyright.".. 5 A free speech privilege is thereby built into federal

copyright law as an exception to the copyright monopoly otherwise
granted to authors."6

There are four considerations for determining whether a
particular usage constitutes fair use: (1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit or educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use on
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

7

The

analysis of the facts of Motorola performed immediately below shows
that, in the event that copyright or some equivalent property-like
protection were afforded to the underlying facts of basketball games
and other professional sporting events, the appropriation by
Motorola and STATS in the present case would not constitute a "fair
use" under Section 107 of the Federal Copyright Act.
a.

Applying Fair Use Doctrine to Motorola

If the Second Circuit had found that sporting events are
copyrightable,'
the outcome of Motorola would certainly have
differed. Presupposing the copyrightability of information from
113. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyrightand Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on
the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283, 284 (1979) (arguing for an expanded
First Amendment privilege for the use of copyrighted expression whenever that
expression is newsworthy, and considering "the potential conflict between copyright law
and the first amendment guarantees of free speech and free press" just one year after the
effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
115. See Denicola, supra n. 113, at 293-94 (citing Horace G. Ball, The Law of
Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944)).
116. But see Patterson, supra n. 65, at 3 (arguing that the codified fair use doctrine has
actually operated so as to give copyright owners a basis for increasing their control of
access to copyrighted works).
117. See supra n. 114 and accompanying text; see also Denicola, supra n. 113, at 295.
118. See discussion supra part I(A)(1).
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sporting events, no fair use should have been found in Motorola's or
STATS' appropriation of such information from athletic contests.
Although the fair use doctrine may sometimes be applied when the
alleged infringer has commercial motives ,. "the question of
economic detriment to the copyright owner lies at the core of the fair
use defense,... and [t]he fair use privilege generally has permitted
only those appropriations that do not seriously undermine the basic
policy of economic incentive." 2 ' Most damaging to any potential
application of the fair use doctrine to appropriation of information
from sporting events is the explicit language of the Supreme Court in
Sony Corporationv. Universal City Studios, Inc. 2 ' The Court stated
that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
an unfair exploitation of
1 22
owner of the copyright. 0
b. Analyzing Motorola in Light of First Amendment Policies
The free speech concerns of the First Amendment and the fair
use doctrine are ill-served by the outcome of Motorola. The NBA,
through its competitive efforts, creates information of value to the
public,123 and through its marketing and broadcasting efforts,
disseminates that information. Motorola, STATS, and others who
appropriate that information absent the licensed permission of the
NBA, in contrast, merely take the news created and distributed by
the sports league and its licensed broadcasters and telecast league
games, and retransmit that information to fans for profit. They add
none of their own creativity and do not contribute any "speech" of
their own, thereby supplying nothing of value to the marketplace of
ideas.124
119. See Denicola, supra n. 113, at 294 (citing Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), which was a
consideration of fair use prior to that doctrine's codification, in 1976, as § 107 of the
Copyright Act).
120. Denicola, supra n. 113, at 301; see also Note, supra n. 94, at 1147 (quoting Judge
Preska's District Court opinion in National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and
Tracking Systems, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd sub nom., National
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), which said that Motorola's
products "cross the boundary from mere media coverage of NBA games into competing
commercial appropriation of those games.").
121. 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984).
122. Id. at 451.
123. But see Note, supra n. 94, at 1156 (claiming that only Motorola and STATS, and
not the sports leagues, are in the business of "disseminating news, information, or even
'speech').
124.

See id.
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"Free speech considerations should operate to permit the use of
expression only to the extent necessary to allow the users to make
their own contributions to the marketplace of ideas."'25 None of the
information communicated by the Motorola pagers or the STATS
dial-up on-line service is unavailable by other means more quickly
and at a lower cost to the public. The fact that the information at
stake may be considered news reporting does not automatically
invoke the successful application of the fair use doctrine, especially
where that information is appropriated for commercial use and has an
economic impact on the parties involved.'26 The optimal balance of
free speech concerns and property rights in the reporting of
information underlying sporting events - which information is at least
quasi-commercial - would provide protection to the NBA, its
member teams, and its licensed broadcasters rather than to any freeriding commercial enterprise.
C. Antitrust
Federal antitrust law amounts to a statutory expression of the
capitalist ideal, namely the belief "that firms should compete in an
open and free marketplace to supply consumers with the best possible
product at the lowest possible price and to allocate society's resources
efficiently."' 27 The Sherman Act is Congress' proscription of
concerted action that restrains commercial activities in a way that
hinders free competition in the marketplace.'
It was enacted to
address the concern that such restrictions result in lower levels of
output and higher prices of the product or service in question, and
cause economic harm to the consumer generally.
Given the operational structure of the NBA and the other major
sports leagues, the educated observer might ask why, in light of the
goals of antitrust law, professional sports teams are allowed to form a

125. Denicola, supra n. 113, at 309.
126. Professor Robert Denicola says:
The Copyright Act specifically recognizes news reporting as one of the
traditional forms of fair use. In any proper application of the fair use doctrine,
however, the financial impact of the use must be considered .... [W]hen the
financial impact is indeed substantial, traditional fair use doctrine may be unable
to accommodate the appropriation.
Id. at 312.
127. Ross, supra n. 76, at 644.
128. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared
to be illegal." Weistart, supra n. 49, at 1017 n.10 (quoting Sherman Act § 1, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982))).
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league and pursue national licensing contracts. In fact, these are two
separate questions which have been addressed through case law and a
statutory exemption, respectively.
1.

Sports Leagues On the PlayingField: Legitimate Joint Ventures

The formation of a joint venture from the otherwise separate
member entities, in order to facilitate competition and a level playing
field, has been accepted not only in the realm of professional sports, 9
but also in amateur athletics "' and in music broadcasts. 3' The
formation of a joint venture by any of the sports leagues, comprised
of that sport's member clubs, is not prohibited because these leagues
are necessary for the continued existence and prosperity of the
various members. They operate to increase the quantity and quality
of competition on the court, ice, or field. However, allowing a joint
venture to ensure competition among teams on the playing field does
not imply a license to combine in restraint of trade outside of the
stadium or arena.
2.

Sports Leagues Off the Playing Field: Subject To Antitrust Law

The NBA and other major professional sports leagues are only
considered joint ventures in the production of games. In the sale of
the output of those games, as when setting ticket prices or selling
broadcasting rights, the leagues are treated more like a cartel,'32 which
is the quintessential antitrust violation. In fact, the pooling of team
broadcast rights into a single broadcasting package was once
condemned as an antitrust violation.'33 In response Congress passed
129. See L.A. Memorial Coliseum v. Natl. Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th
Cir. 1984) (stating that the acceptable controls are those compelled by necessity for the
functioning of a league of competitive teams, including league action to schedule games,
foster a league race, and promote the economic viability of the teams).
130. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (saying
that the NCAA's role in the coordination of college football games widens consumer
choice of collegiate athletic contests, thus providing a procompetitive justification for the
NCAA's on-the-field operations that outweighs any anticompetitive effects).
131. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (holding that a joint
selling arrangement may, in certain circumstances, be so efficient as to increase output and
be procompetitive).
132. See Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law 431 (1st ed. 1993)
(noting that Chicago Professional Sports L.P. & WGN v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961
F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992), upheld the characterization of the NBA as "a joint venture in
the production of games but more like a cartel in the sale of its output").
133. See Phillip M. Cox II, Flag on the Play? The Siphoning Effect on Sports
Television, 47 Fed. Comm. L.J. 571, 574 (1995) (recalling that the NFL's packaged sale of
its teams' broadcast rights to CBS television violated the antitrust laws (citing U.S. v. Natl.
FootballLeague, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1961))).
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the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961,13' which provides the four major
professional sports leagues135 with an antitrust exemption with respect
to the sale or transfer of "all or any part of the rights of such league's
member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games ... engaged
in or conducted by such clubs., 13 6 Although the legislation was
originally directed toward radio broadcasts and telecasts, it is a fair
interpretation of the Sports Broadcasting Act to say that it extends so
far as to allow for sponsored transmissions, by the sports leagues or
their licensees, of real-time information via new media that was not
specifically contemplated in 1961 but is clearly within the spirit of the
Act.
a. The Sports Broadcasting Act After Motorola:A Shell of Its Former Self
A close reading of the Sports Broadcasting Act, however, brings
into question whether the creation, marketing, and sale of a sports
pager or on-line service by any of the sports leagues, which would be
designed to compete with Motorola, STATS, or other independent
pager producers and on-line services, is legal under the current
antitrust scheme. In light of the Second Circuit's holding in Motorola,
the Sports Broadcasting Act might no longer extend to protect a
sports league's entry into the sports pager or on-line service market.
The Act applies an antitrust exemption only to the "rights of such
league's member clubs,', 3 7 to enter into contracts for the transmission
of real-time information to consumers.
The issue of whether the leagues have "rights" in the information
underlying sporting events, so that those facts would be within the
subject matter of the Act's antitrust exemption, has not yet been
litigated. If the NBA cannot create its own pager - i.e., if the Sports
Broadcasting Act's antitrust exemption does not extend to such a
product created by a joint venture sports league - and if the facts of
games do not enjoy copyright protection,3 8 then the NBA can avail
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1294 (1993).
135. The Sports Broadcasting Act speaks to the rights of the four major professional
football, baseball, basketball, and hockey leagues.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Recall that Motorola clearly held that "athletic events are not copyrightable," as
defined by the subject matter requirement of § 102(a) of the Copyright Act, even though
"the work as a whole is [within] the subject matter protected by the Act," Motorola, 105
F.3d at 846, 848; see also discussion supra n. 13. The court found that professional sports
leagues and, by extension, their member teams, have no rights under copyright law in the
underlying facts of the sporting events that they arrange and in which they participate.
Moreover, the court held that the states cannot legislate to protect those facts under the
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itself of neither state misappropriation law nor a copyright
infringement claim. If the facts are not within the subject matter of
the Sports Broadcasting Act, it appears that any combination by
NBA teams in the "product market"" is an illegal combination in
restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act.
b. An Historical Framework for Considering Sports Information Providers
If the facts of the sporting events are not copyrightable, 140 and if
the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust exemption is found not to
apply to a league's concerted action with respect to those facts, then
the leagues may constitute an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade. Since it is likely that, under a straightforward reading of the
text of the Sports Broadcasting Act, its antitrust exemption does not
extend to any licensing of a portable real-time pager, the NBA's
efforts to create its own pager are subject to antitrust law.14 1 It is
necessary, then, to analyze the likely impact of the antitrust laws upon
a hypothetical pager product put forth by a sports league.
The approved formation of a joint venture professional sports
league, and its right to license the broadcast of its teams' games, 42
combine to allow the collective creation and broadcast of professional
team-oriented athletic events. However, this does not address any
additional aspect of the use of those broadcasts or the underlying
facts of those games. The Supreme Court, in Natl. Collegiate Athletic
Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla.,14 1 found that, although some
agreements in college football are necessary for competition,'"
restraints on the televising of college football games are unnecessary
preemption provisions of § 301, absent an extremely limited "hot news" exception.
139. See supra n. 132 and accompanying text.
140. See supra n. 13 and accompanying text.
141. In fact, at the time of the Motorola decision, the NBA was developing just such a
pager. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853 (explaining the expected expansion of the NBA's
"Gamestats" internal arena media information service into an NBA pager product
designed to compete with Motorola's SportsTrax). As of early 1998, however, the
Gamestats pager had not yet been introduced as a product available to the general public.
142. This right is qualified in part by § 1292 of the Sports Broadcasting Act, which
interrupts application of the antitrust exemption if a sports league restricts the broadcast
right purchaser or licensee in any geographical area, "except within the home territory of a
member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1292. This final clause, which is typically called the "black-out" provision, is most
frequently exercised by the National Football League. For a full discussion of NFL "blackouts," see Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Blacked-Out ProfessionalTeam Sports
Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32
Harv. J. on Legis. 403 (1995).
143. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
144. See supra n. 132.
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and have "a significant potential for anticompetitive effects."' 45 They

therefore constitute illegal restrictions of output under the Sherman
Act. The Court directly confronted an organization that was
legitimately operating as a joint venture in order to conduct organized
sporting events through the use of a standard set of on-field rules and
regulations, but found that the same combination with respect to the
transmission of information from those events was an illegal restraint
of trade.
The NCAA entered an arrangement with the ABC and CBS
television networks wherein the networks would telecast a set
number of college football games each year at a pre-established
price.'46 The NCAA thereby prevented any independent negotiation
of broadcast licensing terms by the various NCAA-member colleges,
and prohibited the national telecast of any games apart from the 14
live broadcasts allowed to each network under the broadcasting
agreement. Because the district court had found that the right to
broadcast college football games constituted a unique product for
which there was no clear substitute (obviating the need for collective
protective action), and that the NCAA's television plan "reduce[d]
the volume of television rights sold,'

47

the Court declared that the

effects of the collective licensing agreement were sufficiently
restrictive of output, and without pro-competitive justification, such
that the agreement constituted an illegal restraint of trade under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1'4
i.

The NBA in the Consumer Product Market

The possibility of the NBA's entry into the portable electronic
pager market presents a situation not altogether different from that
presented in NCAA. The NBA, like the NCAA, is a legitimate sports
joint venture for the purpose of on-court competition. Its entry into
the pager product market would be akin to the NCAA's agreements

145. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
146. See id. at 93 n. 11.
147. Id. at 115.
148. NCAA is often cited for its dicta that market power is irrelevant to a finding of an
illegal restriction on price or output. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100. The Court found the
NCAA's argument that an agreement, absent any market power on the part of the
defendant party, could not have any anticompetitive effects to be both legally incorrect
and, in light of the facts of the case, factually inapplicable. Rather, a "naked restraint on
price or output requires some competitive justification, even in the absence of a detailed
market analysis," and, in any event, the NCAA "[did] possess market power." Id. at 11011. Therefore, any analysis of the antitrust issues present in Motorola need not extend to a
detailed evaluation of the parties' market power in the relevant product market.
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to enter the television broadcast market. NCAA made explicit the
distinction between legitimate agreements necessary for the
operation of a joint business enterprise and unnecessary
anticompetitive restrictions on trade. The unique problem inherent in
joint ventures is that independent organizations act as a single
productive unit for the purposes of the particular venture, but "their
desirable coordination in one respect might have an undesirable spill'
over effect on their competitiveness in other respects."149
The NBA necessarily coordinates and regulates much of the
conduct involving league teams and players. For example, in Molinas
v. Nat'l Basketball Assoc.,"' the District Court for the Southern
District of New York upheld as reasonable the existence and
application of a disciplinary rule invoked against gambling which
resulted in the suspension of an NBA player for violation of the
player's contract and 'league rules."' However, the NBA may enter
illegal territory upon entering the product market for sports pagers,
where such coordination is unnecessary for the efficient operation of
a joint venture sports league.
It is uncertain what doctrinal area of antitrust law is best suited
to address the issues surrounding the anticompetitive effects of joint
venture agreements. The late esteemed Harvard Law School
professor Phillip Areeda and his colleague Louis Kaplow have
suggested that, since "joint ventures are, in many respects, partial
mergers," they might best be analyzed under the case law developed
in response to conglomerate mergers.'52 However, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, with almost universal application, has treated joint
ventures as simple horizontal agreements. 53 A professional sports
league, when it enters a product market in which coordination is
inessential for operation, subjects itself to the antitrust scrutiny
directed at any other horizontal agreement in restraint of trade.
149. Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis 271 (4th ed. 1988).
150. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
151. Id. at 244.
152. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra n. 149, at 270 n.42.
153. See e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) ("[T]he
NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint - an agreement among
competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another"); BroadcastMusic,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) (agreeing that blanket licenses for copyrighted musical
compositions are horizontal arrangements among competitors, but holding that because
the license offered is "quite different from anything any individual owner could issue," the
price fixing involved could not be called per se illegal); U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("an agreement [among members of a cooperative association] to
allocate territories in order to minimize competition.., is usually termed a 'horizontal'
restraint").
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From among the many horizontal restraint cases, the one with
facts most closely resembling those of a hypothetical antitrust case
against the NBA for the development, marketing, and sale of a sports
pager is BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem.154 In
that case, the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") were each
granted the nonexclusive right to license the use of copyrighted
musical compositions. Both organizations operated by selling blanket
licenses, giving radio and television broadcasters (typically) the right
to broadcast any and all of the compositions in the ASCAP/BMI
libraries for a fixed fee - either a percentage of total revenues or a flat
dollar amount. Against charges brought by CBS that the blanket
license was, among other things, illegal price fixing, the Supreme
Court held that "[n]ot all arrangements among actual or potential
competitors that have an impact on price are per se violations of the
' In stating that the
Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints." 55
ASCAP/BMI blanket licenses were nonexclusive, since broadcasters
could go directly to the compositions' copyright owners to obtain a
license, and produced procompetitive results by introducing an
additional option into the marketplace for broadcasters who chose
not to purchase such licenses in a piece-meal fashion,'56 the Supreme
Court rejected the per se illegality of price fixing for cases in which it
is in the public interest to combine and set prices.'57 The Court then
remanded the case for a determination of reasonableness.
ii. The Public Interest in the Locus of Control Over the Facts of Sporting
Events
Just as in NCAA, the facts of the underlying sports events are not
copyrightable, but the NBA would nevertheless assert its clubs' right
to license their own games for broadcast. "8 Also, as in NCAA, the
NBA would like to restrict the quantity of information outlets even

154.

441 U.S. at 1.

155. Id. at 23.
156. See id. at 20 ("A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the
thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be avoided.").
157. The Supreme Court thereby modified it's earlier ruling, in U.S. v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940), that "price fixing combinations which lack
Congressional sanction are illegal per se."
158. This activity was clearly acceptable until the Second Circuit's decision in
Motorola, which moved Professors Weiler and Roberts to claim that "it is on a rather
fragile legal reed that rests the rights to sports broadcasts that are now being sold for
billions of dollars a year." Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 32, at ch. 6C. See also supra nn. 1316 and accompanying text.
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though the information itself may be in the public domain. From the
standpoint of the public interest, should the NBA be allowed to assert
this control through property-like protection of that information?
Professional sports leagues are already monopolies, in the sense
that each of the four major leagues lacks a single noteworthy
competitor. Given the NBA's market power, might it use a property
right in the information generated from its monopoly in sporting
events to create a pager with prohibitively high prices for consumers?
In economic terms, the NBA might be able to decrease the supply of
information to the public while charging prices above those currently
charged by pager companies and on-line services, thereby accruing
monopoly rents.
It is nevertheless argued herein that the NBA should be allowed
to exercise control over the information created by the staging of
professional basketball games; at the very least, control over that
information ought not pass to companies that make no significant
investment in the creation of that information. There is a substantial
gain to the public interest from affording protection to the NBA, and
the other sports leagues, with respect to the use of the information
from the games they create for the time period during which the
games are being played. As mentioned earlier,'59 competition in the
market for transmitting real-time accounts of the information for
sporting events puts the sports leagues in substantial financial
jeopardy. The resulting harm to the value of the broadcast and
telecast contracts is so great as to require at least some protection for
the economic incentives that induce the licensing of these
transmissions.
Countering this argument is the idea that the removal of the
competitive effect might lead to the monopoly rents suggested above.
However, such rents are unlikely to come about. Live sports
broadcasts do not only compete with other television and radio
programs, but also with other entertainment and leisure activities.
Any noteworthy increase in the price of real-time information would
lead all but the most devoted fans to pursue other forms of recreation
during the playing of the games, since they would not be deprived of
the information all together but rather could receive it immediately
following the game. Given the limited duration of the proposed
protection, the marginal gain from adding property rights and
incentive effects clearly outweighs any damage caused by the removal
of competitive effects. Providing additional property rights to the
159. See discussion supra part II.A.2.b.
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sports leagues, rather than to free-riding commercial competitors, is
the best means of supporting the public's interest in receiving the
most information from sporting events as quickly and as cheaply as
possible.
c. Horizontal Agreements: Applying the Antitrust Laws to LeagueSponsored Pagers and On-Line Services
i. The Legal Background
If the Sports Broadcasting Act does not provide an antitrust
exemption for the NBA's sale of a sports pager or on-line service,
then the standard antitrust analysis for a horizontal agreement in
restraint of trade should be applied. Despite the factual similarity of
the hypothetical NBA sports pager and the ASCAP/BMI blanket
license, the Motorola holding makes the legal background quite
different from the situation at the time BMI was decided. In
Motorola, the Second Circuit stated that there is no federal property
protection for the facts of sporting events, and that federal copyright
law preempts the application of any state misappropriation
prohibitions.'" The kind of collective arrangement made necessary in
BMI in order to increase access to copyrighted compositions is
therefore unnecessary with respect to sports pagers that transmit realtime information, since the facts of the sporting events are in the
public domain. This makes the case of sports pagers different from
the earlier cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
horizontal agreements among members of joint ventures, since in
each of those cases there had been at issue a limited or protected
highly-desirable resource (e.g., copyrighted materials, 6' broadcast
rights, 62 or high quality merchandise163 ).
The standard Sherman Act analysis in the area of horizontal
agreements stems from Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'6 which first
applied the rule of reason to the effects of horizontal combinations in
restraint of trade. The common law standard, as applied to the
Sherman Act, is that only those combinations in restraint of trade
which are unreasonable are also illegal.' The rule of reason was
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
Section

Motorola, 105 F.3d at 841.
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
See U.S. v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
Standard Oil, in effect, operated to disclaim a literal reading of the language of
1 of the Sherman Act, which states that "[e]very contract, combination... , or
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further clarified in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. U.S.,166 which focused the
analysis on the effects of a trade practice, including those impacting
the public interest. The Supreme Court said that the test for legality
of a restraint of trade "is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress competition."'67
Because the Motorola court found that the information being
generated by sporting events and distributed to the fans is in the
public domain and not copyrightable, the NBA will not likely face
liability for any restraint of trade of information. There can hardly be
any suppression of the use of information which is in the public
domain and over which no one entity has control."
ii. The Factual Analysis
The combination of the NBA teams in a joint venture that enters
the consumer electronics product market, however, is suspect from
the standpoint of a rule of reason antitrust analysis. Consider
Associated Pressv. United States,'69 in which the Supreme Court found

that a horizontal arrangement aimed at the destruction of
competition could not survive antitrust scrutiny.' In that case, the
AP effectively blocked competing news organizations from entering
the marketplace. The AP entered into agreements with newspapers
such that parties to those agreements would be the exclusive outlets
of AP stories in their respective localities. In exchange, the members
agreed that the AP would remain the exclusive outlet for the news
stories that the separate papers generated.
In an analogous fashion, the NBA markets its products, as it
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." See supra n. 128 (emphasis added). Only unreasonable
restraints of trade are illegal.
166. 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (upholding as reasonable a restriction on the hours of
business operation of the Chicago grain market).
167. Id. at 238.
168. In another antitrust case involving the exchange of information, McCann v. N.Y.

Stock Exch., 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), the Second Circuit found that, where the
exchange of information was a public good, there would be no antitrust liability because
"[tlhe end avowed - ridding the [NYSE] of unscrupulous persons - was not only lawful
but commendable,..." Id. at 912. Although the NBA's pager cannot go so far as to cite
the excising of undesirable elements from its midst, the goal of marketing a product
desired by consumers is in no way illegal - provided, of course, that it survives the
(admittedly circular) requirement of being free of illegality under the antitrust laws in the
first place.
169. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
170. See id. at 13-14.

20001

NBA V. MOTOROLA: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

would a hypothetical sports pager, on behalf of its member clubs,
dividing the revenues received among the member clubs. Although
the consolidation of such activity has, until now, been thought of as a
natural function of a professional sports league, three of the four
major sports would have to entirely rethink their policies and
practices if the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust exemption is
limited as this Article suggests.'71 (Major League Baseball would have
fewer problems in maintaining its coordinated activities, given its
antitrust exemption. This exemption, first pronounced by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs,172 has been frequently
criticized and subject to hostile legislative debate, but it nevertheless
remains the controlling decision in the area.' 3)
Reasonable minds can differ as to whether trade is restrained at
all when the NBA markets and sells a product on behalf of the NBA
teams. The product market for sports pagers should, under the theory
of a perfectly free market, operate efficiently. Electronics companies
will enter the pager market as suppliers as long as it is profitable to do
so, and given that the facts of NBA games are in the public domain,
the barriers to entry would be relatively few (unlike the situation in
BMI, where the compositions licensed by ASCAP/BMI were
protected by copyright). It is hard to see how the trade of real-time
information from sporting events is restricted by the NBA's entry into
the pager market. The addition of the NBA as a pager supplier would
only serve to add a competitor to the number of sports pager
manufacturers who already trade in this public information.
171. See discussion supra part II(C)(2)(a).
172. See 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (holding that the sport of baseball is a purely state
affair, and that the mere transportation of people across state lines for the purposes of
viewing and participating in baseball games does not make the exhibition of the game
sufficiently interstate to justify coverage by the antitrust laws, passed pursuant to
Congress' enumerated powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3).
173. Although the antitrust exemption for baseball has been much maligned over the
last fifty years, Justice Holmes' opinion remains the controlling authority on the issue. See
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 272 (1972) ("In the years that followed [the decision in
FederalBaseball], baseball continued to be subject to intermittent antitrust attack. For the
most part, however, the Holmes opinion was generally and necessarily accepted as
controlling authority."); Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per
curiam) (upholding baseball's antitrust exemption and stating that any change should be
by legislation rather than judicial decree); see also Weistart, supra n. 49, at 1054 n. 130
(quoting Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 369 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1978), which applied
the baseball antitrust exemption "to seven different causes of action, ranging from
improper interference with contract to a denial of constitutional due process and equal
protection").
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Courts, however, based on some existing antitrust jurisprudence,
might reject this conclusion and preclude the NBA's entry into the
sports pager market. It is arguable that, because the NBA would be
entering the pager market instead of its twenty-nine individual
member teams - something they are unlikely to do since they have
the freedom to sit back and obtain a share of the revenues without
incurring a proportional share of the costs - some potential
competitors have been eliminated from the market. If trade is even
slightly restricted in a manner that artificially restricts sales, some
courts might find, the free market is operating imperfectly.
For example, in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,174
defendant department store chain argued that a concerted decision
between that chain and its distributors to refuse to deal with a single
neighboring retailer could not be an antitrust violation because the
elimination of a single market participant "makes little difference to
'
the economy."175
The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
accepting plaintiff retailer's contention that, if the antitrust laws
ignore harm to a single competitor, a slippery slope of unchecked
harm to an increasing number of competitors will lead to the collapse
of the free market system. 76 Market power and market harm is
therefore irrelevant to determinations of antitrust violations with
respect to horizontal agreements.77 Recent Supreme Court cases
indicate that similar restrictions on output are per se violations of the
Sherman Act whenever the practices, by their nature, have a
"substantial potential for impact on competition."178
'
The Motorola Court did not merely eliminate the possibility of
any protection for facts resulting from the NBA's efforts to create
professional basketball games; it also created a prohibition on the
entry of any joint sports venture into the pager market, given the
likely result of the application of traditional antitrust law to
horizontal agreements among competitors in a product market. If
antitrust law prevents an NBA-produced sports pager, a competitor is
shut out of the market, thus causing the very anticompetitive effect
174. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
175. Id. at 213.
176. Id.
177. See also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 ("As a matter of law, the absence of proof of
market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output."); FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 412 (1990) ("Conspirators need not achieve the
dimensions of a monopoly, or even a degree of market power any greater than that
already disclosed by this record, to warrant condemnation under the antitrust laws.").
178. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 433 (citing Jefferson ParishHosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)).
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that the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent. The sports league is
thereby prohibited from reaping the financial rewards that give it the
incentive to produce the underlying NBA games in the first place.'79
III
Saving the Sports Leagues: A Legislative Proposal
This part of the Article proposes a limited federal
misappropriation statute, placed within the text of the Copyright Act,
which would provide property-like protection to the sports leagues.
With this protection, the leagues would continue to benefit, for at
least the duration of the playing of the sporting events they labor to
create, from the incentives for creativity and production of
information as contemplated by copyright law. Accompanying this
misappropriation statute is a compulsory license for pager companies,
on-line services, and any other entities that wish to take the
information arising from the sporting events and distribute it to the
public in real-time. The compulsory license is designed to ensure that
the public has adequate access to such information, thereby
furthering the policies of the First Amendment and the fair use
doctrine which favor the dissemination of information. It also
guarantees that, as long as there is a market for that real-time
information from media other than traditionally free broadcasts and
telecasts, suppliers will be allowed to meet demand, thereby
preserving the competition which lies at the heart of the antitrust
goals.
A.

Outlining the Proposal

The problems created by the Second Circuit's decision in
Motorola require a comprehensive solution. This solution must
protect the sports league in a manner that sufficiently guarantees an
incentive to continue to produce and license for broadcast
professional athletic contests, and must grant to the public sufficient
access to the facts of those contests. At the same time, it must not run
afoul of the policy in favor of competition that is embodied in the
federal antitrust laws. A relatively simple proposal accomplishes all of
these goals.
This Article proposes a two-pronged addition to the federal
Copyright Act. The first prong would grant a property right in the
underlying facts of athletic contests to the producers of the event for

179.

See discussion supra part II.A.2.b.
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the duration of the event. The second, as a necessary corollary to the
new property right, would be a compulsory license allowing sports
pager producers and on-line service providers to use the underlying
facts of sporting events, while those events are being conducted, in a
manner substantially similar to the way in which those facts are
currently distributed. This compulsory license is properly deemed a
"necessary" corollary because "[a] statutory copyright that gives the
copyright owner complete control of public access to the work
following its publication has no constitutional basis. ""
Note that this Article does not advocate a copyright in facts per
se, but rather supports the addition of a misappropriation provision
within the Copyright Act. A warning has often been uttered, in the
wake of Harper & Row, 8' that "Congress may not legislate a
copyright in facts."'82 This Article accepts as valid the proposition that
an amendment to the Copyright Act which adds the facts of sporting
events to the subject matter of copyright would be unconstitutional.
Motorola deprives the professional sports leagues of the fruits of
their labor in a way that enables the sports pager producers and online dial-up service providers to "reap what they have not sown."' 83

The entities which appropriate the news and facts created by the
NBA do so in a manner contemporaneous with the broadcast of the
athletic events.' As the pager and on-line services develop so as to
more closely approximate the experience of watching a game on
television or listening to one on the radio, the professional sports
leagues will face increasing difficulty in procuring broadcast licensing
agreements as consumers defect from bulky televisions and audible
radios toward sleek personal computers and portable pagers.
Although pre-existing compulsory license schemes did not, upon
their enactment, require any addition to the subject matter of

180. Patterson, supra n. 65, at 63.
181. See supra n. 72 and accompanying text.
182. Horvath, supra n. 10, at 484 (citing 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01(B)(2)(b) at 1-44.4 (1997)); see also Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at
370 ("Congress does not have power to override Patent-Copyright Clause limitations by
creating under the Commerce Clause a form of protection of compiled information
coextensive with copyright protection.").
183. See Note, supran. 94, at 1146-47.
184. The Court in Motorola conceded that the two to three minute delay in
transference of the information from the game to the sports pager, and the fifteen second
delay in delivery of those same facts to AOL, "while not precisely contemporaneous, is
nevertheless time-sensitive." Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853. One can certainly expect that
technology will advance so as to make the transfer of information from the stadium to the
pager or on-line consumer nearly instantaneous.
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copyright,185 those provisions all exempt from the pre-existing scope
of copyright protection some specific use of copyrighted works. In the
present situation, there is no such copyright protection for the facts of
sporting events while those events are in progress, so an amendment
to the Copyright Act is both necessary and appropriate. The grant of
a property right in the underlying facts of the sports events would
allow the sports leagues, its member teams, or both (as those entities
may choose to allocate the property by contract), the right to control
such information186
1. The FederalMisappropriationStatute

Recall that the addition of sporting events to-the subject matter
of copyright would be unconstitutional.1" A federal misappropriation

statute enacted under the Commerce Clause, however, placed for the
purposes of convenience within Section 102 of the Copyright Act,
would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Professor Ginsburg argues for a similar statute to protect
compiled information. Compilations were at issue in Feist, where the
fact/expression dichotomy was most clearly drawn. After
acknowledging that copyright protection could not be afforded to
protect compiled information,1" Professor Ginsburg suggested that
"Congress might have the power to enact a misappropriation statute
under the Commerce Clause'89 if the statute set forth a scheme of
185. See Fisch, supra n. 142, at 410, which lists compulsory licenses for the public
performance of musical compositions on jukeboxes, 17 U.S.C. § 116, the use of music and
works of art on public broadcasting, 17 U.S.C. § 118, secondary transmission by cable
television systems, 17 U.S.C. § 111, mechanical royalties for making and distributing
phonorecords, 17 U.S.C. § 115, and satellite transmission for home viewing, 17 U.S.C. §
119. However, n. that the compulsory license prevision with respect to the public
performance of musical compositions on jukeboxes, § 116, has since been eliminated in
light of the Berne Convention's preference for negotiated agreements. See Robert A.
Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 43 (4th ed. Supp. 1996) (noting
the changes implemented by Pub. L. No. 103-1998, H.R. 2840, legislation signed by
President Clinton, on Dec. 17, 1993). Also, n. that the "sunset provision" of § 119,
terminating the compulsory license for satellite television, was extended for a second time,
for an additional period of five years, by President Clinton on October 18, 1994. See id. at
54 (noting the changes implemented by Pub. L. No. 103-369, which also includes extending
cable compulsory licensing to "wireless" television).
186. Although this legislative proposal would ostensibly apply to amateur sports
leagues and other umbrella athletic organizations, such at the National Collegiate Athletic
Association or the International Olympic Committee, such a broad discussion goes
beyond the scope of this Article.
187. See supra n. 182 and accompanying text.
188. See id.
189. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 ("The Congress shall have the power.., to regulate
Commerce... among the several States.").
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protection qualitatively different from a copyright regime."' 9
Illustrating her point, she looked to the Lanham Act, which was
enacted under the Commerce Clause. The Lanham Act, by affording
protection "not against copying per se, but against falsehoods in the
marketplace," is "not substantively equivalent to copyright or patent
protection.""' Similarly, this Article's proposed misappropriation
amendment to the Copyright Act does not prohibit copying, but only
prohibits the distribution and public display of the facts underlying
sporting events while the event is being played, subject to voluntary
and compulsory licensing provisions.
In its most basic form, a federal misappropriation statute would
accord no exclusive right of control over the compiled information
[after the compiled information is made public], but would merely
guarantee the information gatherer the right to be paid for thirdparty use of the information.
A statutory amendment, rather than leaving the policy decisions
to the judiciary as was done in Motorola, should be considered the
preferred method of conferring exclusive control over the facts
underlying sporting events upon the creators of those events.
Professor Stephen Ross, of the law school at the University of Illinois,
advocated a legislative enactment in his article proposing divestiture
of what he deemed to be the two "monopoly sports leagues" namely, Major League Baseball and the NFL.193 He cited three
primary reasons why legislation is a preferable194 way to implement
the divestitures. First, he noted the increased certainty and
predictability that would accompany the legislative enactment.95
Second, he argued that a legislative scheme of sufficient clarity would
protect team owners from liability for conduct they reasonably but

190. Ginsburg, supra n. 65, at 370.
191. Id. at 371.
192. Id. at 372.
193. See Ross, supra n. 76, at 748.
194. Professor Ross made quite clear his intentioned use of the word "preferable" in
this context. However, the reason he gave for this word selection, that "the political power
enjoyed by league owners may prevent passage of such legislation," id., does not apply to
this paper's proposed misappropriation statute for the obvious reason that the league
owners would whole-heartedly support legislation granting them exclusive control over
real-time sporting event information, even in the presence of an accompanying
compulsory license provision. Any league or team owner who might previously have
opposed such legislation would certainly be swayed by the Motorola decision.
195. See Ross, supra n. 76, at 749 ("It is not certain.., that every judge's ruling in an
antitrust sports case will be consistent with this Article's analysis of 'correct' antitrust
doctrine.").
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mistakenly believe to be legal.'96 Finally, he cited a number of legal
obstacles to any appropriate judicial order."9
The first part of the legislative proposal, advocated in this Article
as a misappropriation statute amended to the Copyright Act, would
add sporting events to the list of works of authorship, but it is
important to recall that the new statute would be placed within the
text of the Copyright Act solely for purposes of convenience. This
provision would read as follows:
ProposedAmendment to 17 U.S.C. § 102(a):

(a) Works of authorship include the following categories;
(9) sporting events.19
In order to properly frame the proposed amendment to Section

102(a) of the Copyright Act, entitled "Subject Matter of copyright: In
general," as a misappropriation statute rather than as a new
copyright, the following subsection should be added to Section
102(b), which codifies the idea/expression dichotomy:
ProposedAmendment to 17 U.S.C. § 102(b):
(1) Limitations on exclusive rights:sportingevents.

The protection offered to any original work of authorship
specified in Section 102(a)(9) shall not constitute a copyright, but
rather should constitute a property right of a duration limited to
the initial performance ' 99 of that work, and should be further
limited in accordance with [Proposed] Section 121.
196. See id. at 752 ("Any court ordered divestiture ... would expose Major League
Baseball to treble damage liability for past conduct, although these owners reasonably
may have believed they were immune from antitrust liability based on the judiciallycreated antitrust exemption.").
197. See id. at 752-754, nn. 480, 488 (arguing that baseball's antitrust exemption, see
supra nn. 172-173 and accompanying text, and a federal statute permitting the AFL-NFL
merger, see Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)), each pose legal obstacles to a judicial divestiture remedy).
198. One of the reasons given by the Second Circuit for its exclusion of sporting events
from the subject matter of copyright is that "such events are neither similar nor analogous
to any of the listed [§ 102(a)] categories." Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846. Clearly, proposed
amendment § 102(a)(9) would preclude such a finding in the future.
199. Although some might dispute that a sporting event is actually a performance, see
Horvath, supra n. 10, at 463 n.16 (suggesting that a sporting event is not a "performance"
within the meaning of the Copyright Act, but offering no support for this assertion), it
seems to fall cleanly within the definition of what it means to "perform," for purposes of
the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("To 'perform' a work means to... play ...it,
either directly or by means of [a] process."). Although the definition of "performance"
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The Compulsory License Provision

At the same time that the statutory misappropriation protection
ensures the proper incentives for leagues to produce and license for
broadcast the professional sporting events they arrange, the
compulsory license functions to guarantee that fans will be able to get
real-time game information from pagers and on-line services if such a
market exists. "A compulsory license requires an owner of a
copyrighted work to permit any person use of the copyrighted work
for an established fee."2' Although such provisions are rare, they
have been adopted in five separate instances in the Copyright Act."'
The right of creators to the fruits of their labors has been
historically preferred.0 A compulsory license is a common method,
designed to work within traditional copyright, antitrust, and First
Amendment policies, to provide "a fair market return to the
2 3 The same
copyright owner as an incentive for creative authority.""
would apply to the application of a compulsory license to the subject
matter of a statutory, temporarily exclusive property right.
The purpose of the compulsory license scheme with respect to
the distribution and display of facts from sporting events during the
duration of the performance of those events is to compensate the
sports leagues for revenues lost as the pager market grows. The pager
market would have the effect of depressing the value of traditional
radio and broadcast licensing contracts, while ensuring that the public
has access to the information via pager and on-line services if a
sufficient demand exists. The more powerful the demand in that
market, the greater the fees that the leagues will receive from the
was perhaps intended to encompass the "playing" of phonorecords or the like, nothing
indicates that the language of the Act should be so limited. Section 106 lists rights in the
"public perform[ance]" of "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works," subsection (4), and
"sound recordings," subsection (6), thereby addressing separately the various works of
authorship defined as copyrightable subject matter in § 102(a). If the Copyright Act is
amended to include proposed Section 102(a)(9), making sporting events works of
authorship, then the legislative history should indicate that this definitional clarification
(with respect to "works of authorship" and "performance") is the only instance in which
the placement of the proposed amendment within the confines of the Act, although done
purely as a matter of convenience, is relevant to its interpretation.
200. Fisch, supra n. 142, at 410.
201. See supra n. 185.
202. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 284 (1970) (The idea "that
authors have a natural right to the fruit of their labors is an ancient one.").
203. Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 537 (4th ed.
Michie Co. 1993).
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compulsory license distributions. These licensing fees can be set to
counterbalance any decline in advertising revenues such that, as
broadcast and television licenses are sold by the league for less money
(when and if viewers defect to pagers and the on-line services), the
league can make a reasonable portion of that money back through
fees awarded on the basis of the number of people who receive their
information from new media sources. Since 1993, ad hoc tribunals and
arbitration panels convened by the Librarian of Congress have been
entrusted with the authority to set and change statutory royalty rates
and to distribute royalties whenever there is any disagreement as to
the amount or method of payment.2°4 This Article's proposal provides
for a similar authority within its compulsory license.
The final part of the legislative proposal, a compulsory license
for the use of facts from sporting events (in effect, an exemption from
the misappropriation provision, with a statutory royalty payment),
would read as follows: 5

204. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (1996); see also Gorman & Ginsburg, supra n. 185, at 43.
205. Although this statute incorporates provisions from, and concepts supporting,
multiple compulsory license provisions, the language is largely borrowed from 17 U.S.C. §
115, the provision of the Copyright Act providing for a compulsory license for making and
distributing phonorecords (applied most commonly to cover versions of previouslyreleased musical works).
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ProposedSection 17 U.S.C. § 121: Scope of exclusive rights in sporting
events: Compulsory license for distributingand displaying facts from
the performance of sporting events.
In the case of sporting events, the exclusive rights provided by
clauses (3) and (5) of Section 106, to distribute and to display
publicly the information from such works, are subject to compulsory licensing under the conditions specified by this Section.
(a) Availability and Scope of Compulsory License.
(1) When sporting events have been performed to the
public in the United States under the authority of the
property right owner, any other person, including those
who manufacture portable pager systems and those who
operate on-line services, may, by complying with the
provisions of this Section, obtain a compulsory license to
distribute and to display publicly the facts arising from
the performance of these works, notwithstanding the
misappropriation prohibition of [proposed] Section
102(b)(1).
(2) The compulsory license allowed by this provision
pertains only to the facts arising from the performance of
sporting events, and not to the broadcasts of the events
themselves, which broadcasts continue to enjoy copyright
protection as provided elsewhere in this Act and by
common law.
(b) Notice of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License.
(1) Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory
license under this Section shall, before distributing or
displaying the facts arising from the performance of the
work, serve notice of intention to do so on the copyright
owner.
(2) Failure to serve or file the notice required by clause
(1) forecloses the possibility of a compulsory license and,
in the absence of a negotiated license, renders the
distribution and display of the facts arising from the
performance of the work actionable as acts of
infringement under Section 501 and fully subject to the
remedies provided by Sections 502 through 506 and 509.
(c) Royalty Payable Under Compulsory License.
(1) To be entitled to receive royalties under a compulsory
license, the property right owner must be identified in the
registration or other public records of the Copyright
Office.
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(2) The royalty under a compulsory license shall be
payable for every person who receives information
regarding the performance of the sporting events, in
accordance with the license, during the performance of
such works.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws,
any property right owners of sporting events and any
persons entitled to obtain a compulsory license under
subsection (a)(1) may negotiate and agree upon the terms
and rates of royalty payments under this paragraph.
License agreements voluntarily negotiated at any time
between one or more property right owners of sporting
events and one or more persons entitled to obtain a
compulsory license under Section (a)(1) shall be given
effect in lieu of any determination by the Librarian of
Congress made pursuant to clause (4) and Chapter 8.
(4) In the absence of license agreements negotiated under
clause (3), the Librarian of Congress shall, pursuant to
Chapter 8, convene a property right arbitration royalty
panel to determine and publish in the Federal Register a
schedule of rates and terms which shall be binding on all
property right owners of sporting events and persons
entitled to obtain a compulsory license under subsection
(a)(1).
B. Justifying the Proposal
1.

The Goals of Copyright Law

The compulsory license proposal satisfies the policies behind all
three major doctrinal areas reviewed in this Article. First, it addresses
the dual concerns of copyright law: the proposed amendments to
Sections 102(a) and (b) grant to the leagues the fruits of their labor as
a means of preserving the economic incentive to create works of
value to the public, while proposed Section 121 ensures that the
public will be able to obtain real-time information from any willing
suppliers, if a sufficient market for such information exists. Copyright
generally is a statutory exception to the antitrust laws that provides
some protection to authors of creative works, and the
misappropriation statute serves the same function for the sports
leagues with respect to the underlying facts of the games without
giving the leagues complete and exclusive control over that factual
information.
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The Goals of the FirstAmendment and the Fair Use Doctrine

The legislative proposal advocated in this Article is also
consistent with the policies behind the First Amendment's protection
of free speech, as is similarly embodied in the copyright notion of fair
use. The compulsory license guarantees that, if a sufficient demand
exists for the dissemination of real-time information from sources
other than the traditional broadcast media, commercial companies
who are willing to satisfy that demand will be able to do so. This is an
appropriate balance of the conflict between economic property rights
and the First Amendment guarantee of free speech: the information
remains available to the public via pager and other new media
services (under the compulsory license provision), while the economic
incentive for producing the sporting events and licensing them for
broadcast remains with the sports leagues (pursuant to the proposed
misappropriation statute).
3.

The Goals of Antitrust Law

The goals of antitrust law are also addressed, as the compulsory
license provision (proposed new Section 121) allows for as many
competitors in the pager product and on-line service market as the
market demands. Sports leagues are special entities in that there is an
''economic interdependence of the league participants and [a] need
for cooperative decisionmaking," with interrelation that is "so
extensive that league participants can fairly be said to be co-venturers
pursuing a common end. ' '20 As such, some control exercised by the
league, as an oversight entity representing the individual teams, over
the facts arising from the sporting events they prepare and perform, is
not inconsistent with the promotion of competition.
In the absence of any property rights in the facts of sporting
events, broadcasting revenues will decrease in rough proportion to
the success of pagers and on-line services that free-ride on the efforts
of the leagues and their licensed broadcasts. The availability of radio
broadcasts and over-the-air - i.e., free to the public - or cable
telecasts of sporting events will inevitably decline. Nor is it a viable
argument that leagues and teams would not go so far as to decrease
the quantity of games performed. The participants in now defunct
leagues like the United States Football League and the World
Hockey Association would argue that such a decreased output is
206. Weistart, supra n. 49, at 1039 ("[W]e must be prepared to accept that some
organizational forms less formal than a traditional corporation or partnership may remain
beyond the ambit of Section 1 [of the Sherman Act].").
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eminently possible.2 7 "Without careful preservation of the coventurers' interests in these matters, the incentives for the type of
cooperative behavior essential to a league will be substantially
diminished."2 °8
C. Likely Impact of the Proposal on the Leagues, the Fans, and the Pager
Producers and On-Line Service Providers
The proposed scheme of a federal misappropriation statute and a

compulsory license2' will have a number of probable effects on the
relevant constituencies - namely, the professional sports leagues, the
sports fan, and the pager producer/on-line service provider.
1.

Impact on the Sports Leagues

The sports leagues are the most visible beneficiaries of this
Article's proposal. If a market for real-time sports information from
non-traditional media outlets exists, then the royalties set by the
Librarian of Congress will accrue to the leagues if pagers or on-line
services enter into the market as suppliers of that information. If, on
the other hand, no such market exists, the leagues can continue to
issue real-time broadcast and telecast licenses, the value of which will
be upheld as the misappropriation provisions preserve their
exclusivity.
2. Impact on the Fans

Fans similarly benefit from the proposed statutory scheme. The
consumer's enjoyment of games planned by the leagues is protected
by a plan that provides the leagues with an economic incentive to
continue that production. If fans want to get the information from
207. See Allen Abel, When Hell Froze Over, Sports Illustrated 98-110 (Apr. 6, 1998)
(recounting the trials and tribulations of the World Hockey Association, which began in
the fall of 1972 and was merged into the National Hockey League seven years later).
208. Weistart, supra n. 49, at 1042, 1044 (finding a proprietary interest held by the
operator of a professional football franchise, comprised of "a right to identify with the
NFL, to partake of its carefully nurtured preferred position among football fans, and to
share in the considerable rewards of internal revenue-sharing").
209. A similar compulsory license scheme was proposed by Alan Fisch of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, echoing Congress and other scholars who advocated such a
scheme. See Fisch, supra n. 142, at 409 n.46 (citing H.R. 935, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
and Zimbalist, supra n. 41, at 176, both supporting the concept of compulsory licensing).
When the National Football League, in possession of the exclusive right to perform the
broadcast of league games publicly, refused to license "blacked out" television broadcasts
to commercial viewing establishments, Mr. Fisch advocated a compulsory license scheme
which would include reasonable royalties set by the Librarian of Congress. See Fisch,
supra n. 142, at 411 n.60.
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pagers or similar outlets other than existing over-the-air or cable
broadcasts, the compulsory license allows for a sufficient demand to
spur an adequate supply. Although the royalties, payable by the
compulsory licensees to the sports leagues that generate the
information, might theoretically increase slightly the price to the
consumer for obtaining that information, sports leagues will not be
able to use the new property right in real-time information to
significantly raise prices for the real-time information they create.
This is so because the protection of that information from
misappropriation is of such limited duration, any decrease in
competitive effects from that protection will be minimized by the
compulsory license provision, and the otherpotential leisure activity
options for the average fan will dilute the impact of any marginal
suppression of competition."'
3.

Impact on the PagerProducers and On-Line Service Providers

Finally, although the pager producers and on-line service
providers will be somewhat harmed by the proposed statutory
amendments, any such harm can be justified by the benefits accruing
to the leagues and the fans, respectively, as discussed in the
immediately preceding paragraphs. Most certainly, the compulsory
license royalty will raise costs for these non-sports league suppliers of
information. The suppliers will simply pass along the costs to their
consumers, the average fan. Although the increased price for the
product or service offered might, according to basic economic theory,
decrease sales and net revenues, it is this Article's position that any
decrease in output, if at all, will be slight."' Although free-market
supporters would decry even the possibility of an artificially
decreased output, especially when due to protective legislation
targeted to benefit a single industry, the benefits accruing to the
average fan to justify the proposed scheme.

210. See discussion supra part II.C.2.b.ii.
211. See discussion supra part III.C.2.
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Conclusion
The decision of the Second Circuit in NBA v. Motorola is
incorrect as a matter of copyright law and runs counter to public
policy. It frustrates the goals of the Federal Copyright Act, the
guarantees of the First Amendment as reflected in the fair use
doctrine of copyright, and the purposes of federal antitrust laws. A
legislative proposal comprised of a federal misappropriation statute,
which would provide professional sports leagues with a property right
in the underlying facts of professional sporting events, and a
compulsory license for those entities that wish to appropriate those
facts for commercial gain, is the best means of protecting the interests
of the average fan. The proposal will reinforce the incentives for
sports leagues to arrange and license for broadcast professional
sporting events, and will ensure that access to the information from
those games will be available in the manner and quantity desired by
the public.
The impact of the Motorola decision on the commercial sports
pager and on-line service market has not been what one might expect.
In a recent incarnation of the Motorola sports pager (the ESPN To
Go Sports Information Receiver),212 the variety of real-time
professional basketball game information available has actually
declined since the NBA lost its suit. Instead of the myriad of
"current" mode statistics considered by the Second Circuit,213
Motorola offered only (i) score updates every three minutes; and (ii)
the top scorers for each game at half-time and at the end of the
game."' This information is similar to what the Motorola court
considered to be information from the pager's "statistics" mode, and

212. The contractual arrangement between Motorola and ESPN that leads to the use
of the ESPN name in the marketing of the Motorola sports pager is unclear. One of the
functions available for subscribers to all of the various sports available on the pager
service is "ESPN Commentary." See Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products
<http://www.mot.com/MIMS/MSPG/Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (Mar. 13, 1998).
Two possible delineations of the contractual arrangement are that ESPN actually provides
to Motorola the facts that it uses on its pager system, or in the alternative, that Motorola
continues to gather the information itself as it did at the time of the suit, and simply
purchases a license for the use of the ESPN name and the analyses of ESPN reporters not, it should be noted, on a real-time basis.
213. See supra n. 34 and accompanying text.
214. See Motorola.com, Motorola Messaging Products <http://www.mot.com/MIMS/
MSPG/Special/ESPN/espn.homepage.html> (Mar. 13, 1998).
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was not in dispute in the suit brought by the NBA.215 The amount of
real-time information from NBA games as provided by this particular
pager company therefore declined after the Motorola decision, which
is not what would be expected given the newly-affirmed public status
of the facts from those games. The ultimate impact of Motorola
remains to be seen, but it is just this market uncertainty which makes
the legislative proposal advocated in this Article so important to the
survival2 and
success of professional sports leagues, and to the public
6
1
interest.

215. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 844 n.1.
216. For the discussion of why a legislative proposal is the best means by which the
goals sought by this paper can be satisfied, see supra nn. 193-197 and accompanying text.

